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Articles
Principles and Persons:
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Raconteuse
Kenneth L. Karst*
Before she was appointed to the judiciary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was often identified as
the nation’s foremost legal advocate for women’s claim to equal citizenship.
Eventually, some years after she had become Justice Ginsburg, she was assigned to
write the opinion for the Supreme Court’s most sweeping decision validating that claim.
Throughout her career as lawyer and judge, she has had a number of occasions to tell
the stories of her former clients and other women. This Article considers several themes
in those references, in particular her persistent efforts to give credit to other women for
their courage and their fortitude.

* David G. Price and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law. I offer
this comment in memory of Martin D. Ginsburg. He is the very model of a modern masculinity.
My thanks to Leslie Karst for reviewing a draft of this Article.
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In the recognition of women’s constitutional right to equal
citizenship, the Supreme Court went from near zero to a point
approaching 100% in the quarter century from 1971 to 1996. As every
reader knows, in the 1970s the leading women’s rights advocate to the
Court was Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and in 1996, when that Court set the
capstone on this development, it was Justice Ginsburg who wrote the
1
Court’s opinion. It is no wonder that, when she is invited to write or
speak, she is expected to discuss the Constitution’s guarantees of equal
2
rights for women. Obviously, she doesn’t own the subject, but surely she
is entitled to preside over it in its grand scale. My main point in this
comment is that the grand scale is by no means her only subject. She
repeatedly invokes the images of individual citizens, both advocates and
clients, who have claimed and proclaimed women’s rights to equality.
Her stories begin early, with the campaign of Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony opposing ratification of the Fourteenth
3
Amendment. These suffragists were worried that the amendment’s second
section, with its repeated references to “male” in tandem with “citizen,”
would undermine women’s efforts to appeal to the amendment’s
4
substantive guarantees. As then-Judge Ginsburg wrote in 1986, their
5
skepticism was justified. For the Fourteenth Amendment’s first century,
the Equal Protection Clause was useless in the quest for women’s
6
equality. The individuals whose experiences are recounted by Ginsburg
are not limited to major figures like Stanton and Anthony. They include
people whose names identify cases that are now familiar—think of Sally
7
Reed or Stephen Wiesenfeld. Behind the delays and the advances in
constitutional rights, she identifies the conditions and doings of particular
people. When she speaks of principles, she points to persons.
In the discussion that follows, I call attention to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s writings before she was a judge and her later writings other
8
than judicial opinions. These writings compose a considerable body of

1. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
2. The writing on the constitutional law of women’s rights is distinguished. I shall not list
authors, for fear of making careless omissions. Anyone who reads this will have her own list—and
many of you would be on any list that I might offer. Some of you have disagreed sharply with Justice
Ginsburg’s views. Most of you are cited—and always treated with respect—in Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 9, 17.
3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 41, 41 (1986) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Interpretations].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The cases involving these people appear in every decent casebook on constitutional law. They
are discussed infra notes 12–37 and accompanying text.
8. I shall cite some sources beyond Justice Ginsburg’s own writing, but at the outset I want to
identify one article that is indispensable for anyone who wants to understand her work as an advocate
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work, and a big proportion of it recounts the acts and feelings of other
individuals. Plainly, she wants to know—and wants us to know—about
the law’s interactions with people, one by one. Still, if you pay attention
to the stories she tells, you will sense that her own story lies underneath.
At first, she was Professor Ginsburg in the Rutgers (Newark) Law
9
School. At the request of students, she designed and taught a course on
women and the law. In 1970, she remarked to a panel of the Association
of American Law Schools that such “courses develop two themes: the
part law has played in assisting society to ‘protect’ women (and keep
them in their place) and the stimulus law might provide in the evolution
of society toward equality and independence for the still submissive
10
sex.” Law teachers who use the “case method” in their classrooms—
that is, nearly all of us—know the educational value of viewing the law’s
effects on individual litigants in real-life situations. However long ago we
may have studied law, we all remember the facts of some classroom
cases, and even think of some legal rules with those litigants at least
dimly in mind. Outside the classroom, Professor Ginsburg was the
inspiration and founding director of the Women’s Law Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union—a responsibility she carried with her in
1972 when she moved to Columbia Law School. Just as a trial lawyer will
present the testimony of particular witnesses as a story that fits her
client’s version of the case, an appellate lawyer will seek to educate
judges by similar means. So, well before she joined the judiciary in 1980,
Justice Ginsburg’s experiences as teacher and lawyer had given her a
solid grounding in the art of relating legal principles to the lives of
individuals.
Some of her teaching and all of her litigation focused on securing
women’s full recognition as equal citizens, and her early writings on the
subject were part of a political campaign. From the beginning, Professor
Ginsburg understood that her litigation was only one element in a larger
social movement that was bringing new opportunities to women. Her job
as a litigator was to teach about women’s capacities and the injustice of
denying them full participation in public and private institutions. One
goal of this educational effort was to call attention to the rapid increase
in women’s participation in the ranks of workers, and particularly in
positions of great responsibility. To counteract long-standing stereotypes
of “the nature of woman”—women in general—she brought into the

and as a judge: Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 251 (2009). From 1983 to 1984, Professor
Klarman clerked for Judge Ginsburg in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 251.
9. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Consciousness in the Law
Schools, 5 Val. U. L. Rev. 480, 480 (1971).
10. Id.
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courtroom the lives of particular women and men. Her writings in the
1970s brought those litigants’ stories to the attention of lawyers, and also
to readers of journals aimed primarily at a larger audience of women.
Many in this latter group did not need convincing, but they did need
information about the movement’s progress in one field after another. In
short, she was teaching both women and men about the implications of
women’s equal citizenship. The experiences of her clients could serve as
talking points in many contexts.
In Professor Ginsburg’s litigation campaign in the 1970s, and in her
more general writings, her accounts of individuals’ lives have served
instrumental purposes. Even today, Justice Ginsburg’s writings teach her
listeners and readers similar lessons. But these descriptions are not
merely instrumental. Whether she is discussing the cases that were the
subjects of her own briefs and arguments, or describing earlier cases in
which women’s claims were defeated, or recounting the work of others
who have served the cause of women’s equal citizenship, her stories
make clear that she cares about their protagonists. Professor Ginsburg
saw her forerunner advocates, and the litigants in their cases, as
individuals. Her writings in later years show that she has retained that
regard—and that concern—for each advocate and each litigant that she
11
discusses. I applaud her for that.

Three 1970s Clients Whose Cases Changed the Law,
and One Might-Have-Been
From the beginning, Professor Ginsburg saw what seemed to be
coming. In 1971, in a speech to a group of law women, she mentioned an
12
ACLU case in the current term, Reed v. Reed, saying, “the turning point
13
is in view.” She went on to give her audience a quick summary of the
14
15
facts in Sally Reed’s case. In later writings, she elaborated. Sally Reed
16
and her husband Cecil were separated. Her only income was her pay for
taking elderly people into her home for care. At first, Sally had custody
11. Here I should note that I have known her since her days at Rutgers and Columbia, and we
have stayed in touch for half a century. Today, she is as considerate (and, we shall see, as generous) as
she was in the 1960s.
12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
13. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. Fam. L.
347, 353 (1971).
14. Id. at 353–54.
15. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 263, 267 (1997)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Equal Stature]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 1, 10 (1975) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Gender]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women’s
Progress in the Legal Profession in the United States, 33 Tulsa L.J. 13, 17 (1997); Ginsburg & Flagg,
supra note 2, at 15.
16. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 267.
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of their son Richard, but when he was no longer “of tender years” he was
17
placed in the custody of his father. He “fell in with a bad crowd and
spent some time in a corrections facility.” Upon release to his father’s
custody, he was deeply depressed, and at age twenty, he killed himself
with his father’s gun. Sally wanted to deal with Richard’s belongings, and
petitioned the Idaho court to be appointed administrator of the boy’s
estate; soon afterward, Cecil entered his own petition. The court did not
hold a hearing, but appointed Cecil. Under the governing Idaho statute,
in a case of conflicting petitions from persons “equally entitled” to
administer the estate of a decedent, “males must be preferred to
18
females.” The Supreme Court’s decision striking down the Idaho law
19
was unanimous. Today’s law students see this as a clear-cut case of sex
discrimination, and so it is; but when Reed was decided, it broke new
ground. The Equal Protection Clause, a central feature of the Fourteenth
Amendment adopted in 1868, had its very first application to sex
discrimination a century later. Reed was, indeed, a turning point.
Two years later, the Court took its next step in Frontiero v.
20
Richardson. Professor Ginsburg’s client was Sharon Frontiero, a U.S.
Air Force Lieutenant. Sharon’s husband, Joseph Frontiero, was a fulltime college student, receiving support under the G.I. Bill. Sharon’s pay
provided three-fourths of the family’s income. Under the governing
regulations, however, she was not entitled to a housing allowance; nor
was her husband entitled to medical benefits, for his income provided
just over half of his own support. If the sexes were reversed, the
regulations provided that a male officer would get those family benefits
automatically. As Professor Ginsburg later said, the regulation thus
21
“presumed a wife’s, but not a husband’s, dependent status.” This sort of
discrimination was found in many statutes, notably those provided in the
system of Social Security. The Frontieros both sued, alleging
discrimination against Sharon (denied benefits a male officer would get)
22
and against Joseph (denied benefits a service wife would get). The
Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, held this discrimination

17. The “tender years” boundary itself resulted from stereotyping: A mother gives comfort
during a boy’s tender years, and a father is a role model as the boy learns to be a man in a man’s
world.
18. The Idaho legislature had repealed this statute—but only prospectively—before the case was
decided by the Supreme Court. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
19. The vote was 7–0. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71. Justices Black and Harlan had retired, and President
Nixon had not yet appointed Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
20. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The “personal” aspects of this case, described below, are set out in
Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 15, at 21.
21. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 15.
22. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 15, at 21.
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23

unconstitutional. Four of the Justices agreed with Professor Ginsburg’s
argument that governmental sex discrimination should be evaluated
under a “strict scrutiny” standard of review, but three others in the
majority suggested that the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment
24
made such a ruling premature. In a lecture the following year, Professor
Ginsburg said, “Reed and Frontiero had the appearance of well-planned
25
first steps in a sustained litigation campaign.” She should know.
The woman in the case named Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld was not the
26
plaintiff (Stephen), but his wife, Paula Polatschek Wiesenfeld. She had
27
taught mathematics in a public school in New Jersey. When she died in
childbirth, baby Jason survived, and Stephen wanted to care for Jason
28
personally at home. As Justice Ginsburg put it not long ago, “He vowed
29
not to work full-time until his son was in school full-time.” The Social
Security system would provide what the law called “Mother’s insurance
benefits” for stay-at-home widow-mothers, but not for stay-at-home
30
widower-fathers. Thus the law discriminated against female workers
(reducing the value of their work) and also against the men who were
women’s surviving spouses—and, of course, their children. Plainly, the
law’s distinction was founded on the “protective” assumption that
women who are widowed need a replacement for the income lost when
fathers die, but men—assumed to be breadwinners—need no such aid.
31
Professor Ginsburg won Stephen’s case, again from a unanimous Court.
In a 1997 lecture—some twenty-two years after this decision—Justice
Ginsburg remarked that Stephen Wiesenfeld had been “an extraordinarily
32
devoted parent.” She went on to note that Jason was then “completing
33
his third year at Columbia Law School.” Now, where did he get that
idea?
One more set of Ginsburgian recollections, before we move on: In
her 1993 Madison Lecture, given just before Judge Ginsburg became
Justice Ginsburg, she told the story of another client of hers in the early
34
1970s. The case might have been a doctrinal game-changer—but the
23. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678–91 (1973).
24. Id.
25. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 15, at 12.
26. 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975).
27. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 16.
28. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Elena Kagan, Remarks Commemorating Celebration 55: The
Women’s Leadership Summit, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 233, 247 (2009).
29. Id.
30. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 637 n.1.
31. Id. at 637.
32. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 268.
33. Id.
34. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1200–02 (1992)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Judicial Voice]. The case is Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972)
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Supreme Court had not decided it. Like Frontiero, this one arose in the
military. Captain Susan Struck, a nursing supervisor, had made the Air
Force her career. Her commanding colonel called her work “exemplary,”
but her career was threatened when she became pregnant while she was
in Vietnam. An Air Force regulation made childbirth a ground for
mandatory termination of a woman officer’s commission. Another
regulation offered Air Force hospital facilities for abortion—indeed,
encouraged such a resort to preserve an officer’s career—but Captain
Struck’s religion closed that avenue. She used her accumulated leave
time for the childbirth and promptly placed the infant for adoption. On
her behalf, Professor Ginsburg argued in federal court that the Air
Force’s regulation violated Captain Struck’s equal protection rights
because it imposed no limitation on male officers who became fathers. A
powerful argument, we now understand.
The lower courts didn’t see it that way; they denied relief. The
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari—whereupon the Air Force
waived its regulation and allowed Captain Struck to continue her career.
The Court then dismissed the case as moot. Two decades later, Judge
Ginsburg remarked that, if the Supreme Court had decided Struck v.
Secretary of Defense, it might have issued a relatively narrow opinion
founded on women’s equality-based constitutional right to control their
own bodies—thus making way for a gradual recognition of women’s
35
reproductive rights. In her own litigation, Professor Ginsburg had
adopted just such a gradual approach to nudge the Court toward a more
generalized validation of women’s equal citizenship. She suggested that if
the Court had adopted a similar approach in this field, perhaps it might
36
have avoided the shock of Roe v. Wade and the massive political
37
mobilization triggered by that decision. We’ll never know.

Giving Credit
What we do know—partly because Judge Ginsburg reminded us—is
that Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld were all decisions of the Burger
38
Court, not its “liberal” predecessor. It is characteristic of her to give
credit where credit is due, notably including credit to women in earlier

(mem.). Pages cited here include all references to the Struck case that follow.
35. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 34, at 1202.
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 34, at 1200; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381 (1985).
38. Ginsburg, Interpretations, supra note 3, at 42–43. In a footnote, Judge Ginsburg also cited
eight more women’s rights decisions of the Burger Court. Id. at 42–43 n.8. In my judgment, the most
important of these later decisions was Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., majority opinion). See infra note 40.
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times who fought the good fight for women’s equality, but without
success. The heroines of her stories include judges, litigants, and
advocates in court; they also include women whose advocacy found
venues outside the courtroom. Every one of them is offered as a role
model.
During her Supreme Court years, Justice Ginsburg has identified a
number of female judges who have been her own role models. Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, of course, gets high marks for introducing her
new colleague to the Court’s arcana. But, more generally, Justice
Ginsburg gives her sister Justice credit for serving the cause of women’s
equality. This credit is entirely deserved. When Justice O’Connor joined
the Court, the two most recent decisions on women’s equality issues had
diluted the strong standard of review for sex discrimination recently
39
established in Craig v. Boren, but her appointment was crucial in
40
restoring order. It is no accident that, when Justice Ginsburg wants to
show Justice O’Connor at her best, she does so by quoting her words
spoken to a conference on “Women in Power”: “As women achieve
power, the barriers will fall. As society sees what women can do, as
women see what women can do, there will be more women out there
41
doing things, and we’ll all be better off for it.” If you were taking a
Supreme Court quiz and asked to identify the author of those sentences,
wouldn’t you pause before answering?
In 1995, addressing a conference of female judges, Justice Ginsburg
told the stories of three women who were among the earliest to serve as
federal judges: Florence Ellinwood Allen, Burnita Shelton Matthews,
42
and Shirley Mount Hufstedler. I offer only brief summaries here—all
taken from Justice Ginsburg’s talk. Judge Allen was a polymath: concert
39. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). As the Craig opinion had it, a law that limited women but not men would
be invalid unless it contributed in a substantial way to achieving an important government interest. Id.
at 197. In two more recent cases, however, Justice Rehnquist led majorities to uphold such laws when
men and women were “not similarly situated.” Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(decided 5–4); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981). If this toothless standard had taken hold, it
would have undermined the gains for a constitutionalized right of women’s equality achieved during
the 1970s.
40. Her opinion for the 5–4 majority in Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. at 718–33,
reclaimed the ground Justice Rehnquist had seized, and the Court has not looked back. See infra Part
IV (discussing VMI). On Justice O’Connor’s role in this development, see Kenneth L. Karst, Through
Streets Broad and Narrow: Six “Centrist” Justices on the Paths to Inclusion, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 18–20.
41. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1239,
1240 (2006) (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Address to the Sixteenth Annual Olin Conference:
Women in Power (Nov. 14, 1990)). Justice Ginsburg does make brief mention of Justice O’Connor’s
life story, but that need not be repeated here.
42. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary: Three Way Pavers
and the Exhilarating Change President Carter Wrought, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 281 (1995). Before
reading this speech, I had not known these judges’ given names; we can be confident that Justice
Ginsburg uses them advisedly.
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pianist, music critic, graduate student in political science, highly
successful law student, worker in the settlement-house movement,
prosecutor, suffragist politician, and elected judge, first at the trial level
43
and then at the Ohio Supreme Court. She was the first woman to serve
on a state’s highest court, and after eleven years there (and some
unsuccessful candidacies for Congress), in 1934 President Roosevelt
appointed her to the Sixth Circuit—where she was again a “first woman.”
There she served for twenty-five years and in her final year on the court
she was its senior member and Chief Judge. In Justice Ginsburg’s words,
Judge Allen portrayed “a catalogue of firsts,” and she continued her
advocacy of women’s equality throughout her life. President Truman
identified her as a possible appointee to the Supreme Court, but was
dissuaded by Chief Justice Vinson, a Truman poker buddy. Such was life
in the late 1940s.
In 1949 Truman did, however, appoint Burnita Shelton Matthews as
the first woman to serve as a federal district judge in the District of
44
Columbia. While working for the Veterans Administration, Matthews
had attended night law classes at National University, the forerunner of
today’s George Washington University. She was a committed suffragist
and had been counsel to the national Woman’s Party. The Party sought
to repeal laws “protecting” women by excluding them from various kinds
of work. Justice Ginsburg quotes a 1926 comment in the American Bar
Association Journal in which Matthews, after deploring men’s inability to
see this injustice, says, “But then it is not surprising when one remembers
that this defective vision, this regard of discriminations as ‘protection’ is
45
traditional.” Sound familiar? A reader of Justice Ginsburg’s article
about these “way pavers” will notice her repeated insistence on giving
credit to her predecessors in the struggle for equal rights for women. As
the 1926 date for this quotation indicates, “struggle” is not too strong a
word. Matthews had served as an active federal district judge for
nineteen years when failing health made her accept the status of senior
judge. In that capacity, she sat on a number of panels of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals. When she retired in 1984, President Reagan expressed
the nation’s gratitude for her service.
The third judge featured in Justice Ginsburg’s 1995 article is
California’s own Shirley Hufstedler, who almost certainly would have
been the first woman Justice of the Supreme Court, if only President

43. Id. at 281–83. All the following references to Judge Allen are contained in this passage.
44. Id. at 284. All the references to Judge Matthews by Ginsburg and Brill, supra note 42, are at
pages 284–85.
45. Id. at 285 (quoting Burnita Shelton Matthews, Women Should Have Equal Rights with Men: A
Reply, 12 A.B.A. J. 117, 120 (1926)).
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Carter had had a vacancy to fill. Justice Ginsburg knows her well, and
expresses the appreciation and affection that Shirley Hufstedler has
inspired in all who have known her. Hufstedler finished at the top of her
class at Stanford Law School, and after about ten years in practice she
had served as a judge in the superior court and then the California Court
of Appeal. In 1968 President Johnson appointed her to the Ninth Circuit
bench, where she stayed until President Carter tapped her to be the first
Secretary for the newly created Department of Education. Justice
Ginsburg takes note of a number of Hufstedler’s views on public issues,
and quotes her on rights of personal privacy and on the harms done to
children by myths of group dominance and inferiority. These excerpts
remind us that the idea of a Justice Hufstedler had great appeal. I can
attest that lawyers in California fully expected Hufstedler to be
appointed to the Supreme Court—but in our era there can be only nine
Justices at a time, and President Carter was not reelected in 1980. It may
be, however, that the buzz about a “first woman Justice” was still audible
in 1981, when President Reagan’s initial appointment to the Court was
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
To understand my next example of Justice Ginsburg’s pattern of
crediting others for their contributions to the movement for women’s
47
equality, you should know about the Court’s decision in Hoyt v. Florida,
the modern judicial nadir for the consideration of women’s concerns.
48
The story of this case has been related by Professor Ginsburg, by Judge
49
50
Ginsburg, and by Justice Ginsburg. Gwendolyn Hoyt, a battered
woman, testified that she had been wounded, insulted, and humiliated by
her philandering husband—on one occasion enraging her to the point
51
that she responded by hitting him with their son’s baseball bat. He fell
52
back, hit his head on a hard surface, and quickly died. Gwendolyn was
53
convicted of second degree murder. All of the jurors in her case were
54
men. Under Florida law, women were not obliged to do any jury
service; a woman would be placed on the jury roll only if she volunteered
55
and registered. Gwendolyn’s ACLU lawyer, Dorothy Kenyon, argued
to the Supreme Court that, given the testimony, a jury containing women

46. Ginsburg & Brill, supra note 42, at 286. All references to Judge Hufstedler are at pages 286–87.
47. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
48. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451, 456 (1978)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Sex Equality].
49. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 13–14.
50. Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 266.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58 (1961).
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might well have convicted Gwendolyn of the lesser crime of
56
manslaughter. The unanimous Warren Court, in an opinion by the
57
second Justice Harlan, rejected this argument. The Justices saw the
Florida law as a generous treatment of women, allowing them to keep
58
their place at “the center of home and family life.”
Professor Ginsburg pointed out that, at the time of Hoyt, “the
majority of adult women . . . either had not entered or had passed the
stage when children requiring all-day or after-school care are part of the
59
family unit.” Judge Ginsburg commented that Gwendolyn “suspected
that women sitting in judgment on her case would better understand her
60
plight and plea.” This view was shared by Justice Ginsburg, who made
the point more specifically: “with some women on the jury,
[Gwendolyn’s] state of mind at the time of the fatal blow might have
been comprehended more accurately by her triers, and her crime
61
perhaps reduced to manslaughter.” Justice Ginsburg later added that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyt followed a line of precedent that
reflected the long-prevailing “separate spheres” mentality, the notion
that it was man’s lot, because of his nature, to be the breadwinner, the
head of household, the representative of the family outside the home;
and it was woman’s lot, because of her nature, to bear and alone to
62
raise children and keep the house in order.

In 1971, when Professor Ginsburg submitted the brief in Reed v.
Reed, on the brief’s cover she added the names of two predecessor
63
advocates, both associated with the ACLU. One was Pauli Murray, a
long-time fighter for racial and gender justice, and the other was Dorothy
64
Kenyon, who had argued the Hoyt case ten years earlier. The Hoyt
65
precedent itself crumbled in 1975 as the Supreme Court went about
revising its treatment of women’s constitutional claims to equality.
Meanwhile, Professor Ginsburg was giving credit to others who had
helped pave the way for her successes.

Belva Lockwood’s Tale
Justice Ginsburg continues to give credit. In 2008, in a conversation
with Elena Kagan, then Dean of Harvard Law School, she emphasized

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 266.
Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62.
Id.
Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 48, at 456.
Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 13.
Ginsburg, Interpretations, supra note 3, at 42.
Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533–34 (1975).
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that “we should appreciate the women on whose shoulders we stand,
women who said the same things we said many years later, but we spoke
66
at a time when society was willing to listen.” This conversation was
presented to a group of women who had been graduated by the law
67
school in the fifty-five years since 1953. The graduating class of 1953
had been the first in that school’s history to include women. Justice
Ginsburg had been a major draw for Celebration 55, and Dean Kagan
68
was delighted to invite her to return. Much of the time was given to a
“Q and A” session in which the dean asked questions and the Justice
responded. But Justice Ginsburg was assigned time near the beginning
for her own statement, and she devoted all of that time to a sketch of the
life of Belva Lockwood (1830–1917), an early champion of women’s
69
rights to equality. By 2008, of course, the main doctrinal battles in the
Supreme Court had been won. To understand what the Justice had in
mind, we must pay attention to what she emphasized in her tour through
Lockwood’s life. All of the following story is adapted from the Justice’s
talk.
70
Lockwood grew up on a farm in upstate New York. She married at
eighteen, had a child, and was widowed at age twenty-two. She went to
college and became a schoolteacher and then a principal. At age thirtysix, she moved to Washington, D.C., and after two years, married again.
She was an active suffragist and she advocated equal employment
opportunities for women, and equal pay, too. She decided to become a
lawyer and applied for admission to law study at the National University.
The school rejected her application, so that she would not “distract the
attention of the young men.” She persisted, and the school eventually
admitted her. She completed her work, but the school officials would not
give her a diploma, for fear of reducing the value of men’s diplomas.
Lockwood took the bull by the horns, writing to the ex officio president
of the University—that is, the President of the United States, the Union’s
soldier-hero, Ulysses S. Grant. She did not beg. She said she had
completed the work, and “I demand my diploma.” Two weeks later, the
Chancellor gave her the degree and the diploma. That was 1873, mind
you.

66. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 237.
67. My own class, as it happens. When we started in the fall of 1950, there were twelve women,
three for each section.
68. At one point, Justice Ginsburg was discussing changes in the Supreme Court and the
appointment of women. She mentioned that Justice Stevens, then eighty-eight, might be the next to
retire. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 245. When he did retire, as you know, Elena Kagan (then
serving as Solicitor General) filled that vacancy.
69. Id. at 234–37.
70. Id. at 235. All references in this paragraph are at page 235.
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Three years of law practice in D.C. entitled Lockwood to apply for
admission to the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court—but the Court denied
71
her application. End of story, right? Wrong. She took her case to
Congress, which in 1879 adopted a law entitling a woman to be admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court if she met the qualifications
72
applied to men. Thus, Belva Lockwood was the first woman to argue a
73
case before the Court. During her years at the Supreme Court bar, she
74
twice ran for President as the candidate of the Equal Rights Party. A
woman still could not vote, but nothing in the Constitution said she could
not be elected President. Her campaigns brought to the public’s notice a
number of issues that other candidates ignored—supporting not just
women’s rights but also the causes of Native Americans and Chinese
75
immigrants and Civil War veterans. Throughout all of these tribulations,
she believed her cause would prevail.
Justice Ginsburg went on to tell the assembled women that she had
decorated her own chambers with a replica of the vote of the Justices
refusing to admit Lockwood to the Court’s bar, and with “one of several
less than flattering cartoons published during her 1884 presidential run
76
against Cleveland and Blaine.”
All right—so what’s going on in this meeting, at this late date in the
movement for women’s equality? Justice Ginsburg has seen an
opportunity to teach, this time to an audience of women, most of whom
see themselves as committed advocates for the cause they share with her.
Her telling of Belva Lockwood’s story personalizes some lessons to be
learned—and learned again:
 Belief in equal justice is not enough. You have an obligation to
take action to achieve full equality.
 You must be determined to overcome obstacles.
 You must extend your efforts to the limit of your ability.
 Courage is often required; don’t be afraid.
 Be optimistic; it can be done.

Just reading such a set of instructions may be intimidating, but it is
also affecting. When the teacher has credentials as strong as Justice

71. Id. Justice Ginsburg points out that Chief Justice Waite, when he gave her the bad news, did
not mention his own vote in favor of her admission. But only three Justices out of the nine had voted
for her. Id. at 235–36.
72. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 236.
73. Justice Ginsburg tells us that Lockwood, soon after her own admission, moved the admission
of Samuel R. Lowery to practice. He thus became the first African American lawyer from the South to
join the Court’s bar. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 237.
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Ginsburg’s, the lessons must be heeded. Furthermore, her own
performance at the bar and on the bench shows that one can be firm and
still be conciliatory. Speaking of her present position, she has said,
77
“We’re in the business of persuasion.”

The Social Setting for VMI
78
The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in United States v. Virginia has
been detailed and analyzed over and over. On the chance that there is
one reader who does not know: In that case the Court held that the
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal
79
Protection Clause. I had my say on the case soon after the decision
80
came down, and I shall not add another analysis to the stack. In the
view of Mary Anne Case, VMI was “an extremely easy case, the logical
culmination of a long line of cases . . . . Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
author of the majority opinion, stands at both ends of this line, now able
81
to affirm as a Justice what she first argued as an advocate.” Even so, it is
notable that the Supreme Court reached its decision by a 7–1 vote, with
82
Chief Justice Rehnquist joining in the result.
In this case, Justice Ginsburg had no occasion to dramatize the issue
before the Court with a particular woman’s story. The plaintiff, after all,
was the United States, which had sued after the Justice Department
83
learned, in an official way, of VMI’s males-only policy. A high school
84
girl had complained to the Department in 1990, but the district judge
85
had not even mentioned her name in his opinion. VMI and its “expert”
witnesses made clear that women were being excluded because VMI is a
military school and war is man’s business. That was quite enough for
Justice Scalia, whose dissent, predictably, resonated in the higher

77. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 240.
78. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
79. Id. at 519.
80. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, “The Way Women Are”: Some Notes in the Margin for Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 619 (1998).
81. Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1450 (2000).
82. The Chief Justice did not join Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court, but still concluded
that VMI’s exclusion of female applicants violated the Equal Protection Clause. United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). If Justice Thomas had not recused himself, my
guess is that he would have joined Justice Scalia in dissent. Justice Thomas’s son was attending VMI.
83. The United States sued under Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6
(2010). United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991).
84. Id. It is worth noting that the lawsuit was brought by the Department during the
administration of the first President Bush.
85. Id. at 1407.
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86

registers of voice. Six years later, however, Justice Ginsburg remarked
that the case had not been “a close call,” and she added:
Public understanding had advanced so that people could perceive that
the VMI case was not really about the military. Nor did the Court
question the value of single-sex schools. Instead, VMI was about a State
that invested heavily in a college designed to produce business and civic
leaders, that for generations succeeded admirably in the endeavor, and
87
that strictly limited this unparalleled opportunity to men.

The reference to public understanding brings us to another theme
that pervades Justice Ginsburg’s writings: the importance of changes in
the public’s attitudes in underpinning the Supreme Court’s changes in
constitutional interpretation. As she said in 2008, “Courts are reactive
88
institutions . . . . [Social change] has to start with the people.”
Looking back to her litigation campaign of the 1970s, Judge
89
Ginsburg said, “I was lucky to be in the right place, at the right time.”
Indeed, the times had been changing in a number of ways that were
undermining traditional forms of sex discrimination. Just before she
became a judge, Professor Ginsburg had called attention to some of
these social changes: a decline in the need for women to produce at
home; an expansion of the service sector of the economy, offering new
jobs to women; increased availability of means to control reproduction;
90
increased life spans. The two-earner family was rapidly becoming the
91
standard. All of these developments increased judges’—including
Justices’—awareness of “a sea change in United States society,” an
“evolving enlightenment” intensified by “the briefs filed in Court, the
women lawyers and jurists they nowadays routinely encounter, and
perhaps most deeply by the aspirations of the women, particularly the
92
daughters and granddaughters in their own families and communities.”
As Justice Ginsburg told Elena Kagan in discussing the 1970s litigation
93
campaign, “we spoke at a time when society was willing to listen.”
Referring to earlier women’s rights litigators, she added immediately, in

86. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566–603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 189, 197
(2003) (2002 speech at Southwestern University School of Law) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Place for
Women].
88. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 243.
89. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 2, at 11.
90. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,
1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 167.
91. Id.; see Ginsburg, Equal Stature, supra note 15, at 269.
92. Ginsburg, Place for Women, supra note 87, at 198. Klarman, supra note 8, at 291–94, shows
how the changing climate for social reform offered complications to Professor Ginsburg’s litigation
campaign. (After all, if conditions for women’s participation in society are improving, who needs
litigation?) Professor Klarman makes clear that she met the challenge. Id. at 297–98.
93. Ginsburg & Kagan, supra note 28, at 237.

Karst_63-HLJ-1197 (Do Not Delete)

1212

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/24/2012 8:33 PM

[Vol. 63:1197

a way that we now see as typical of her, to give credit to those who had
gone before: “[These] women . . . were saying a generation before, the
same things we were saying, . . . but society was not yet prepared to
listen. So we were standing on their shoulders, and they were models of
94
courage for us because they didn’t take no for an answer.”
The shade of Belva Lockwood smiled.

94. Id. at 238.
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